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DOI 10.1186/s12913-015-0771-xRESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessHospital board oversight of quality and
safety: a stakeholder analysis exploring the
role of trust and intelligence
Ross Millar1*, Tim Freeman2 and Russell Mannion1Abstract
Background: Hospital boards, those executive members charged with developing appropriate organisational
strategies and cultures, have an important role to play in safeguarding the care provided by their organisation.
However, recent concerns have been raised over boards’ ability to enact their duty to ensure the quality and safety
of care. This paper offers critical reflection on the relationship between hospital board oversight and patient safety.
In doing so it highlights new perspectives and suggestions for developing this area of study.
Methods: The article draws on 10 interviews with key informants and policy actors who form part of the ‘issue
network’ interested in the promotion of patient safety in the English National Health Service.
Results: The interviews surfaced a series of narratives regarding hospital board oversight of patient safety. These
elaborated on the role of trust and intelligence in highlighting the potential dangers and limitations of approaches
to hospital board oversight which have been narrowly focused on a risk-based view of organisational performance.
In response, a need to engage with the development of trust based organisational relationships is identified, in
which effective board oversight is built on ‘trust’ characterised by styles of leadership and behaviours that are
attentive to the needs and concerns of both staff and patients. Effective board oversight also requires the gathering
and triangulating of ‘intelligence’ generated from both national and local information sources.
Conclusions: We call for a re-imagination of hospital board oversight in the light of these different perspectives
and articulate an emerging research agenda in this area.
Keywords: Boards, Quality, Patient Safety, Trust, IntelligenceBackground
Improving the quality and safety of health care services
remains a key concern for policy makers and practi-
tioners across the globe. Interest in this area continues
to increase as a growing number of empirical studies
document the organisational dimensions associated with
high quality and safe care. Such dimensions include the
importance of open channels of communication which
are founded on mutual trust, strategies to enhance or-
ganisational learning, and the desirability of non-
punitive approaches to adverse event reporting [1].* Correspondence: r.millar@bham.ac.uk
1Health Services Management Centre, University of Birmingham, Park House,
40 Edgbaston Park Road, B15 2RT Birmingham, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
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any medium, provided the original work is pr
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zeroHospital boards have responsibility for developing ap-
propriate organisational strategies, incentives and cul-
tures to support the delivery of quality and safety within
their organisation. Despite this fiduciary responsibility,
questions have been raised about the extent to which
Boards have paid sufficient attention to quality and
safety of care. In the US, the 2010 Affordable Care Act
required hospital boards to take a more proactive role in
strengthening their governance processes to ensure im-
provements in quality and efficiency [2]. In England, the
high profile and well documented failures in professional
practice at Mid Staffordshire hospital trust raised serious
concerns about boards’ reliance on external systems of
checking, verification and audit at the expense of wider
considerations relating to patient care. The Francisicle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
operly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
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Boards’ role in this regard [3,4].
A growing body of work suggests that high quality
healthcare organisations are characterised by boards that
show committed leadership, have an agenda that makes
safety a priority and are comprised of members trained
in, and knowledgeable about, the theory and practice of
quality improvement methodologies [5,6]. Boards which
combine a culture of ‘high trust’ across executive and
non-executive members, together with robust methods
of measuring and monitoring the quality and safety of
patient care, are also associated with higher performance
[7]. Nonetheless, Chambers [7] argues that the features
of ‘high performing’ boards remain open to debate with
only limited evidence on, and agreement about, the
characteristics of an “ideal” Board. This view is sup-
ported by a recent review by Millar et al. [6] who suggest
that our understanding of hospital board oversight in re-
lation to quality and patient safety remains theoretically
and methodologically underdeveloped.
The aim of this paper is to reflect critically on the
current relationship between hospital board oversight
and patient safety. It draws on a series of interviews with
key informants and policy actors in the English NHS
about their perceptions about effective board oversight
of safe care. In doing so the paper analyses the potential
dangers and limitations of approaches to hospital board
oversight which are too narrowly focused on a risk based
view of organisational performance. Furthermore, it calls
for engagement with theoretical perspectives that em-
phasise the development of trust based organisational
relationships in the delivery of high quality care. These
findings support the view that effective board oversight
can be built on ‘trust’ characterised by organisational
leadership styles and behaviours which are attentive to
both staff and patient needs and concerns. In addition,
effective board oversight requires the gathering and tri-
angulation of ‘intelligence’ emanating from both national
and locally generated sources. The paper concludes with
a call for a re-imagination of hospital board oversight in
light of these different perspectives and a look forward
to an emerging research agenda in this area.Governance of patient safety in English hospital trusts
While successive campaigns and central directives have
sought to promote and enhance quality and patient
safety in the English NHS, standards of hospital care
continue to be a cause for concern [3,8]. Over the past
decade, the solution offered to problems over care qual-
ity has predominantly focused on developing better per-
formance metrics and audit frameworks to help tighten
external accountability and scrutiny of healthcare orga-
nisations by central government and regulatory agencies.The prominence of external systems of accountability
and control in the NHS has been highlighted by Maybin
and colleagues [9] who show how hospitals are currently
required to meet a myriad of nationally imposed per-
formance targets that range across clinical and service
quality standards, agreed volumes of activity, and reduc-
tions in health care-acquired infection rates. Hospitals
are legally required to meet essential safety and quality
requirements as part of their registration with the na-
tional healthcare regulator – the Care Quality Commis-
sion (CQC). NHS foundation trusts, those organisations
defined as ‘high-performing’ hospitals and are run as
not-for-profit corporations, have an additional layer of
regulatory oversight provided by the economic regulator -
Monitor - which imposes authorisation standards in re-
lation to internal governance and financial viability.
Two risk ratings for each NHS foundation trust are
assigned in relation to: governance (traffic light red to
green); and finance (rated 1-5, where 1 represents the
highest risk and 5 the lowest) with monitoring and the po-
tential need for regulatory action considered on a
case-by-case basis [10].
This approach to hospital accountability has been as-
sociated with notable achievements in the English NHS
in relation to improving quality and patient safety. In
particular, central performance targets for infection con-
trol have coincided with reductions in hospital infection
rates, especially for MRSA and clostridium difficile [11].
Notwithstanding these achievements, questions remain
about the effectiveness of approaches which rely on ex-
ternal systems of measurement and control [12]. Brown
and Calnan [13,14] summarise how such approaches to
safeguarding in the English NHS based on notions of
‘risk governance’ can lead to deleterious outcomes for
staff and patients as increasing rationalisation and bur-
eaucratic controls impinge upon the more communica-
tive, affective and intangible concerns and interactions
in healthcare [15].
In England, this was recently highlighted in the ac-
counts from patients, families and staff at the public
inquiry into Mid Staffordshire hospital. Despite the self-
assessment rating awarded by the Healthcare Commis-
sion (now renamed the Care Quality Commission) six
months earlier as being assessed as “good”, the Inquiry
highlighted how the culture of the hospital trust was not
conducive to providing good quality and safe patient
care. Contributory factors highlighted in the Inquiry re-
port included styles of management based on bullying
and harassment, the priority given by the board to meet-
ing externally imposed waiting times targets, low staff
morale, ongoing financial difficulties, reduction in staff-
ing, a lack of openness about the hospital’s business,
and the acceptance of poor professional standards and
practice [3,4].
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to the behaviour and conduct of the hospital board and
its members [4]. The board was found to be ‘distanced
from reality’ as patient safety information tended to be
discussed and narrowly filtered between divisional gov-
ernance groups outside of the boardroom. An emphasis
on individual (medical or nurse Director) rather than
collective corporate responsibility for quality and safety
was identified. A lack of adequate impact or risk assess-
ment regarding patient safety was also evident, with ap-
proaches symptomatic of a passive denial arising from a
lack of effective challenge, self-criticism and engagement
with the key issues. The attribution of high mortality fig-
ures to problems with coding and the creation of new
governance structures as an end in itself were symptom-
atic of a focus on maintaining organisational processes
rather than improving patient safety and outcomes.
Bringing in the perspectives of trust and intelligence
The ongoing issues regarding effective governance in
healthcare highlight the possible dangers of board over-
sight practices that are overly reliant on risk-based sys-
tems of assessment and monitoring. In particular, they
include the dangers associated with conforming to the
letter (or number) of the target at the expense of the
non-targeted aspects of health care [16-19] as well as
the problems associated with an over-reliance on formal
quantitative performance measures at the expense of
‘soft intelligence’ which circulates through informal
channels of communication such as personal and profes-
sional networks [20].
Approaches to board oversight which are focused on
meeting the demands of external regulation and based
on risk management also have the potential to erode the
trust required to support healthcare relationships
[13-15,21]. Defined as contexts or situations where social
interaction is based on uncertain knowledge about the
likely action of others and where one depends on their
response for a beneficial outcome [21], the enactment of
trust is often located in the liquid spaces between and
around institutionalised roles. It can be characterised by
commonly shared norms and values, the development of
ethical relations which are not secured by contract or
other regulatory forms, or the acknowledgment of risk
in allowing oneself to be open to disappointment and
regret [12,21].
Summarising Möllering [22], Brown and Calnan [14]
explore how positive expectations associated with trust
are made possible through common understandings of
norms and values which structure the actions of the
trustee. These authors point out that while trust has
often been considered narrowly in terms of its impact
on the truster in helping them manage uncertainty and
vulnerability, it also necessarily places a moral obligationon the trustee in the light of the truster’s positive expec-
tations, thus binding the trustee to expected patterns of
behaviour [22]. In addition to the emotional component
within trust (relating to the positive expectations of
trusters who make themselves vulnerable), it is under-
stood that sanctions will follow where this trust is disap-
pointed. Here, notions of shame and embarrassment are
enacted to control behaviour [23], rather than financial
incentives or bureaucratic sanctions which may ultim-
ately in themselves lead to defensive practices and stifle
or inhibit ‘the social’ aspects of exchange [14].
Reflecting on the trust literature, Brown and Calnan
[14] propose a form of ‘conditional trust’ as a better
basis for governing healthcare professional behaviour.
For these authors, trust is both reflexive (self-challen-
ging, relational) and conditional (earned). Here the con-
ditional element of trust can be achieved by harnessing
available data to make clinical work more visible and
hence accountable, but doing so in a ‘soft’ rather than an
overt or coercive way. Such a view builds on the work of
Davies and Mannion [24] who call for an optimal ‘bal-
ance between checking and trusting’ in relation to clinical
governance. Alongside trust, checking refers to monitor-
ing and challenging poor clinical practice. In doing so,
checking provides managers with a means for holding
professionals to account, particularly the potential monop-
oly of clinicians, to account for their actions [24].
For boards, like individuals and organisations as a
whole, we argue that the neglect of trust in favour of a
reliance on ‘checking’ or ‘confidence’ built through risk
management systems can potentially have the effect of
eroding the traditional social norms and altruistic behav-
iours which characterise long standing working relation-
ships. As Smith [21] suggests, the neglect of trust in
healthcare relations can lead to a disregard towards the
‘ethics of care’ in relation to the moral and affective di-
mensions that are involved in trusting others. Further-
more, the ‘confidence’ brought about by predictability
and certainty associated with risk management may not
be conducive to health and social care services which
are more often characterised by the considerable uncer-
tainty, ambiguity and daily dilemmas associated with the
delivery of care [21].
When we turn to the extant literature on the nature of
effective hospital board oversight of patient safety, many
of these trust related themes are easily surfaced. These
include effective board oversight being associated with
spending sufficient time discussing patient safety issues
at board meetings, reviewing and learning from patient
complaints, taking time to listen to patients and staff,
showing empathy to patient needs and concerns as well
as clearly displaying a commitment to openness and
transparency in all organisational affairs [25,26]. Board
oversight of patient safety is also associated with having
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time and expertise to analyse data on the quality and
safety of care, as well as being able to sustain informal
relationships and dynamics between boards and organ-
isational professional groups [27,28]. Alongside these
features, the literature also points to boards obtaining
intelligence gathered from information systems and
pathways to produce and monitor system progress [29].
Boards that engage in reviewing and tracking organisa-
tional performance through the collection and analysis
of internally generated data (quality dashboards or
scorecards), national benchmarks and soft intelligence
gathered from board walk rounds along with patient and
staff stories and experiences are also associated with im-
provements in quality and safety [30-33].
These activities and characteristics of effective boards
lend themselves to a wider view of board oversight that
moves beyond a purely ‘risk’ based approach to over-
sight. In many ways, this combination of the various ele-
ments supports the view of Jennings et al. [34] that
hospital boards have not only a legal duty of care and
loyalty to the hospital they serve, but that they also have
an ethical role in terms of the norms, expectations and
values, skills, functions and competencies that they instil
throughout the organisation by their behaviour. As out-
lined in the subsection below, Jennings et al. [34] suggest
this means more than governing the hospital as an
“asset” or “commodity in the market place” but also as a
vibrant and viable socio-cultural system, a moral com-
munity with diverse needs, skills and contributions.
Our paper looks to build on the perspectives of trust
and intelligence and analyse their utility within the con-
text of hospital board oversight of patient safety in the
English NHS. In doing so, it aims to contribute to a
tradition of qualitative inquiry that looks to gain infer-
ences from conceptual frameworks and ideas in order to
broaden our understanding of these phenomena. Meyer
and Lunnay [35] summarise how such an approach is
akin to the generation of abductive reasoning in forming
theoretical associations that enable us to discern rela-
tionships and connections that are not otherwise evident
or obvious. Drawing on interviews with members of a
patient safety ‘issue network’, the following sections will
present a range of perspectives that analyse how board
oversight of patient safety can be further developed
through the nurturing of trust-based relationships and the
triangulation of hard and soft intelligence gathered from
both national and locally generated information sources.
The four principles of ethical trusteeship [34]
1. Fidelity to mission: trustees should use their
authority and best effort to promote the mission and
keep that mission alive by interpreting its meaningover time in light of changing circumstances. The
generic mission is to promote health and wellbeing,
to be a civic and health resource for the community,
and to be a place of respectful, well managed and
competent health care provision.
2. Service to patients: Trustees should ensure that high
quality is provided to patient in an effective and
ethically appropriate manner. A diligent oversight of
performance through participating in education and
research, protecting and promoting the rights and
interests of patients ensuring patients and families
are partners in decision making about healthcare.
3. Service to the community: Trustees make hospitals
civic institutions dedicated to improving public
health and quality of civic life of the community as a
whole. Hospitals are integral components of a
community’s identity and traditions. Trustees do
well when they bear in mind the interconnection
with what occurs in the community outside.
4. Institutional stewardship: trustees should sustain and
enhance the integrity of the hospital as an
institution, as an effective organization for the
delivery of high quality health care services and as a
moral community of care giving. This translates into
working with the executive management of the
facility to ensure that it is well run, fiscally sound
and professionally competent. They should protect
the interest of all parties who rely on the hospital.
Methods
The research examined the different ways that those in-
volved in the ‘issue network’ surrounding patient safety
within England made sense of hospital board oversight
of patient safety. Our definition of an issue network
originates from Heclo [36] who defines such networks
as a broad collection of individuals possessing know-
ledge about the issue in question with some influence on
policy outcomes. Such an issue network can be charac-
terised by a wide range of interests, contacts, access, and
level of agreement, resource, and power distributions
among the group members [37]. Examples of these net-
works are often related to environmental, human rights
and criminal justice issues with actors including politicians,
government departments, management and policy consul-
tants, academic researchers, and journalists.
Our research comprised 10 semi-structured interviews
with stakeholders that we identified as contributing to
the patient safety issue network described above. The
aim of these interviews was to contribute to the initial
phase of a national study of hospital Board governance
of patient safety [38]. The research purposefully selected
interviewees on the basis that our research required a
range of stakeholder perspectives that interacted across
multiple interest groups involved in shaping or
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hospital board oversight of patient safety. The sample in-
cluded government departments with representatives
from the Department of Health, the NHS Litigation Au-
thority, the two key regulators, Monitor and the Care
Quality Commission, and a representative from the Na-
tional Patient Safety Agency. We also included what
could be defined as management and policy consultants
with representatives drawn from the Health Foundation,
NHS Confederation, as well as commentators who had
contributed to the public inquiry into Mid Staffordshire
Hospital Trust (see subsection below for further details).
These particular individuals were selected on the
grounds that they had a remit, interest and experience of
quality and safety oversight at hospital board level. 4 out
of the 10 participants who contributed also had previous
experience of being part of a healthcare board in either
an executive and non-executive capacity.
Board oversight of quality and safety issue network
sample
Our sample of interviewees incorporates a range of affilia-
tions with actors drawn from the following perspectives:
 Health Foundation: an independent charity working
to improve the quality of healthcare in the UK (n=1)
 NHS Confederation: a membership body for
organisations that commission and provide NHS
services aiming to bring together and speak on
behalf of the whole of the NHS (n=1)
 Department of Health: ministerial department with
contribution from representatives involved in patient
safety policy development. (n=2)
 NHS Litigation Authority: a not-for-profit part of
the NHS that manages negligence and other claims
against the NHS in England (n=1)
 Monitor: an executive non-departmental public
body of the Department of Health that particularly
oversees and regulates Foundation Trusts (n=1)
 Care Quality Commission: an executive body of the
Department of Health that regulates, inspects and
reviews all adult social care services in England
(n=1)
 National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA): responsible
for identifying and reducing risks to patients
receiving NHS care and lead on national initiatives
to improve patient safety. In June 2012 the Agency
became part of the NHS Commissioning Board
Special Health Authority (n=1)
 Witness and seminar contributors to the Mid
Staffordshire Inquiry (n=2)
The purpose of the interviews was to explore respond-
ent views and perspectives of key dimensions of boardoversight identified in the quality and safety literature.
The interviews were semi structured based on a guide
that asked participants about their views concerning the
issues or problems facing board oversight of patient
safety; the proposed solutions and suggestions for im-
proving board oversight; the key contextual factors or
conditions to achieving effective board oversight; and
the recommendations these participants had for achiev-
ing effective oversight and developing boards in moving
forward.
Following the tradition of patient safety studies else-
where [39], our approach took a narratological perspec-
tive in providing an account of how individuals within
this particular issue network reflected the problems and
solutions related to hospital board oversight. Currie and
Brown [40] note how a narratological approach is par-
ticularly valuable for the light it sheds on individual and
group sense making as people interpret phenomena.
Waring [39] also summarises how such storied accounts
help actors give meaning to often complex and emo-
tional situations through developing plotlines, which are
sometimes ordered and linear, but more often fragmen-
ted and complex.
Data analysis looked to weave together these storied
accounts into a series of narratives that connected to
wider debates concerning trust and intelligence in
healthcare. Here, abductive inferences were made by
(re)interpreting data in conjunction with the existing
theoretical and conceptual in order to reveal a more
comprehensive understanding of this important aspect
of patient safety governance. Discussions ensued within
the research team with the emerging narratives devel-
oped and refined in an iterative process.
The NVivo software programme was used to support
the coding of information that focused on particular
board oversight activities that were suggested as current
problems and solutions. The interviews were carried out
by the lead author between October 2011 and February
2012. The National Research Ethics Service (NRES) in-
formed us that NHS ethical approval was not required
for the study. Informed consent was provided along with
assurances that anonymity would be assured. In respect
to the wishes of some of the interviewees quotations
have been anonymised.
The elite interviewing process enabled the research to
capture some of the key issues within this area of inter-
est. That said there are notable limitations in such an
approach. Elite interviewing by its very nature is limited
to certain perspectives and worldviews about hospital
boards and patient safety that might well exclude mar-
ginal or underrepresented perspectives. As Berry states
[41], excessive personal bias and exaggerated roles repre-
sent an ongoing dynamic and challenge during the elite
interview process. Certainly these findings provide us
Millar et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:196 Page 6 of 12with the dominant shared narratives at the exclusion of
other areas. To counter these potential issues, the re-
searcher did look to probe the views being presented
wherever possible, encouraging interviewees to think
about their current opinions and perspectives, and de-
velop particular points. For example, the emerging
stories regarding the differences and dynamics of non-
executives were something that became particularly
apparent and warranted further probing with all the
interviewees.
Results
The results are presented in four sections that seek to
capture the different perspectives put forward by inter-
viewees. The first section examines the narratives pre-
sented by the issue network concerning current
problems facing Board oversight of patient safety that re-
late to the limitations of risk based approaches to gov-
ernance. The second section examines a collection of
narratives that illustrate the challenges to effective Board
oversight due to the limited knowledge and understand-
ing of patient safety issues from individual Board mem-
bers. The third section explores narratives illustrating
how boards can improve their oversight through the de-
velopment of trust based relationships within their or-
ganisation. Finally, the fourth section outlines an
additional collection of narratives that suggest different
ways that Boards can improve their oversight by paying
greater attention to intelligence gathering as a means of
‘triangulating’ different versions of organisational reality.
Board oversight as a ‘numbers game’
The perspectives from our interviews suggested that ef-
fective hospital board oversight currently faced a num-
ber of challenges. While changes in the policy agenda,
particularly in response to the first Francis inquiry into
the Mid Staffordshire hospital trust [4] and the Darzi re-
view in 2008 [42], had seen quality and safety move up
the political agenda, the oversight of patient safety was
often compromised by the unintended consequences of
relying solely on risk based governance approaches. These
points attempted to illustrate the dangers of conforming
to targets and quantitative performance systems at the ex-
pense of non-targeted aspects and soft intelligence [13].
In large numbers of hospitals, it was suggested that
debates and discussions concerning patient safety often
took second or third place and behind efforts ensure
that hospital finances and central performance targets
were met.
… in most instances they do tend to defer to finance
and activity. And in a crisis, especially in the financial
challenges of today, it is much more comfortable for
Boards to tip over in that way. Partly because of thelack of understanding, partly because in fact patient
safety is incredibly broad, and partly because of the
environment within which they sit…
Within this context, the key issue facing board over-
sight of patient safety was the reliance on externally im-
posed targets, particularly those relating to infection
prevention and control, as the means to assure compli-
ance and performance. There was a view that hospital
boards were heavily challenged by the regulatory envir-
onment that was designed around meeting the govern-
ance and risk based ratings set by Monitor and CQC.
The targets set by these regulators had the potential to
‘dilute the message’ of patient safety for boards, by redu-
cing conceptions of safe care into a series of national
standards and priorities, or specific issues and campaigns
related to hospital acquired infections such as MRSA
and clostridium difficile rates.
MRSA is one out of about a hundred things you could
be doing. That’s just the one where the spotlight falls…
just treating one thing in isolation, ticking those
particular boxes… that is not safety; it’s not safety
culture. That’s a target mentality
[Board] discussion centres on the numbers. So what
you get is people focussed on, “Oh we’ve had two more
of these”, or “Five more of those”, and the attitude of
we should stop having these things… there’s so much
more to it than just the numbers
Board oversight as a ‘silo’ activity
Alongside the problems related to Boards’ overreliance
on targets and the minimisation of institutional risk, a
series of narratives connected the limitations of current
board oversight to the limited knowledge and under-
standing of patient safety issues from individual Board
members. In many cases, the faith placed in external tar-
gets and assurance mechanisms was in large part con-
nected to a lack of skills and understanding to make
sense of patient safety issues and concerns. Central to
this was an over reliance on performance measurement
systems such as red, amber and green (RAG) ratings at
the expense of critical reflection and challenge about
why such issues and trends had arisen [20].
Generally, if they’re asked to produce a list of incidents
and grades of incidents, most of them can do that
absolutely fine. But if they actually have to start
putting together other information to cross match it,
they struggle
the board is focused on reds… but there’s all these
greens, and how do people carry on keeping them
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the whole culture is on reds
There’s that failure to understand a moveable feast
and look and see where you deviated from the norm…
Such limited intelligence also meant that there was a
tendency to ‘compartmentalise’ patient safety. Boards
tended to delegate responsibility to the nurse or medical
director or particular clinical directorates and subcom-
mittee structures. While it was acknowledged such
delegation was in large part a recognition by Boards
that quality and safety required governance subcom-
mittees with dedicated time and focus spent on pa-
tient safety issues, the delegation of responsibility was
also problematic in that Boards were over relying on
governance structures and processes as an end in
themselves as opposed to connecting directly with
patient care.
I think it’s very distant for most of them. You often
hear the phrase trotted out, patient safety is
paramount or patient safety is the most important
thing to us, but in terms of what’s actually done and
delivered, that doesn’t really seem to be backed up…
They may wish to be assured that someone in the
organisation, as it were, deals with patient safety,
however, I don’t know the extent to which they
actually realise the role that they themselves have to
play in it…
Such limited knowledge and understanding of patient
safety among board members, particularly non-
executives, also meant they were often inhibited in chal-
lenging and posing critical questions about safety issues
and concerns. This was exemplified by non-executive di-
rectors (NEDs) who tended not to have a clinical or op-
erational background in healthcare but have skills and
expertise in relation to finance, industry and legal
settings.
the non-execs in the main feel inhibited to challenge in
relation to patient safety and are fearful of what the
right questions are… especially when it comes to clini-
cians… [NEDs] who are recruited tend not to be from
a clinical background… the fact that they don’t have a
clinical background I personally think inhibits their
ability to ask the right questions in relation to safety
This later point reflects a view of Boards unable to or
lacking confidence in the ability to self-challenge. Board
dynamics were leading to defensive practices as certain
Board members would ‘hide’ from discussions and dia-
logue related to patient safety matters rather than createcontexts and situations for social interactions related to
patient safety issues and concerns [21].
Board oversight as building trust relationships
In light of the challenges facing boards, our interviewees
put forward a number of suggestions about how board
oversight of patient safety could be improved. At the
centre of these proposals was the view that oversight
needed to become ‘value driven’ in the development of
relationships that were more sensitive and responsive to
organisational needs and concerns. Rather than a ‘tick
box’ focus on meeting particular targets, board oversight
concerned building trust through the development of
better social interactions and interpersonal connected-
ness with their organisations [21].
Particular board activities and practices were put for-
ward by the interviewees as effective strategies for en-
hancing trust in organisational relationships These
included providing a greater amount of time and em-
phasis on board discussions and dialogue about patient
safety, developing enhanced leadership skills that allow
patient safety to be more visible, and seeing board mem-
bers as ‘stewards’ with responsibility for developing a
culture of partnership within the organisation.
go past a building site these days and you’ll see no
hat, no shoes, no entry. Or you’ll see how many days
since the last safety incident. You may well see a
visible manifestation of safety on that site is
important. What do you see when you go into most
NHS institutions? There isn’t much manifestation of a
visible safety culture. That’s something that the board
could set. They could lead. They could set the
example. They could support…
Stewardship is the right thing, around setting the
culture, asking the right questions. I think they need
courage… to say we’ve got this issue, we don’t know
how to fix it, but what we’re going to try and do is
work out a way together of finding solutions...... in the
plane, whoever says I can hear a noise on the engine,
you all stop and listen. You don’t beat them up for
raising something and they’re beneath contempt. And
that culture of safety is a million miles away until
we’ve got everybody feeling empowered, respected and
encouraged…
Leadership styles were mentioned with regard to the
way board members needed to ‘set the tone’ for the or-
ganisation in enhancing the quality of care. To gain a
deeper understanding of the issues, interviewees de-
scribed board members displaying characteristics that
centred on a curiosity to ask questions and be open to
critical reflection about ‘uncomfortable truths’ within
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this area which relates those boards who discuss, review
and learn from patient safety events with higher per-
forming organisations [25,27,30].
in the end I think actually it comes down to something
like authenticity… it’s about listening to people and it’s
about being genuinely interested in their concerns and
it’s about doing something about it… authenticity
comes from people owning the problem and feeling
motivated to do something about it
it’s about setting some very clear parameters from the
board, some very clear messages, some quite tough
objectives, but they need to be quite realistic even if
they are tough
The role of the chief executive was thought to be im-
portant here in setting the tone for the behaviours and
values of patient safety. Patient safety needed to be ‘a
personal cause’ as was engaging staff and patients about
their concerns.
where the chief exec can be so important is where they
say or they’re attempting to steer or take a trust down
a certain route from a patient safety perspective and
that they don’t just say that… they enable by giving
resources to make it happen, they provide a personal
leadership commitment by being involved, turning up
in person – all the things that demonstrate personal
commitment that turn something from being a paper
exercise to something that’s real and visible on the
ground and happening
It was suggested that the role of the chair was central
to allowing open discussion at board meetings by en-
couraging members to raise salient issues. The medical
and nurse directors acting as custodians for clinical gov-
ernance also had a role to play in setting the patient
safety culture of the organisation as were finance direc-
tors in getting involved in patient safety initiatives and
concerns.
The board have got to set the tone for behaviours and
values, that that’s not to be tolerated. It has to come
from the top and it would have to come from the
Director of Nursing who’s got to get out of her or his
office…They’ve got to challenge their executives to
know how do you know what’s happening on the
wards? And if you don’t know, why don’t you know,
because we want to know?
raising awareness amongst the finance directors of
what they could do that would really make adifference to patient care, because… whether they
themselves understand that personally can make a
difference… in particular in an understanding of
business cases around patient safety, I think that could
be hugely powerful.
Non-executive directors were also important here in
being able to actively challenge executive decisions and
hold the board to account. It was suggested by some that
boards needed greater input from non-executives in pro-
viding the necessary critical reflection in ‘holding up a
mirror’ to the organisation by asking critical and probing
questions which executive members would need to
answer.
non-exec directors should be demanding… demanding
to see real commitment, to see initiatives, to really see
culture change and quite often to lead it as well.
I think you sometimes need to challenge what you’re
seeing because if you’re getting people coming through
time after time and saying, ‘Oh, I’m so delighted this
has happened.’ You think, hang on....
An additional suggestion for fostering greater inter-
connectedness with the wider organisation was opening
up board business to greater staff, patient and public
scrutiny. This it was felt had the potential not only to
further hold the board to account but also to create fur-
ther connections and interactions with the organisation
and the community that the hospital served.
I think maybe Boards have gone a bit too far in terms
of not having people that are representative of real
people on there, and I don’t mean it disparagingly, but
a lot of finance, a lot of accounting people, a lot of
business people… Someone with their heart in the
community would be quite nice or an adversary would
be a nice thing. So I think there’s something about the
makeup of Boards which needs to reflect a bit more the
purpose and the purpose of patients and patient care.
These suggestions to improve the connection between
boards, patients and staff point to the potential of trust
to engender positive organisational norms and values.
The institutional spaces between and around executive
director roles needed to be filled through relationships,
interactions and values rather than necessarily secured
or undermined by formal contracts and external per-
formance targets.
Board oversight as gathering intelligence
Interviewees, particularly those from CQC and Monitor,
suggested that there remained an important role for
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forced by the view that the introduction of external sys-
tems of performance measurement and monitoring had
yielded improvements in several areas, most notably in
relation to reductions in hospital acquired infection
rates.
Nevertheless, our interviewees raised a number of
points about the over reliance on formal quantitative
performance measures in relation patient safety which
came at the expense of ignoring the potential insights
gleaned through soft intelligence networks. Boards in
this respect needed to be exposed to different types of
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information concerning patient safety in
order to increase their intelligence about the issues at
hand.
In relation to hard performance data, it was felt that
greater efforts needed to be made to disaggregate infor-
mation about particular trends within the organisation
rather than rely solely on an aggregated picture of the
organisation as red, amber or green ratings. For example,
one interviewee suggested that the Quality Risk Profiles
(QRPs) capturing mortality data, re-admission data, and
outlier data combined with data on patient outcomes in
relation to dignity, nutrition and privacy provided a use-
ful basis for hospital boards to build on. In addition, the
promotion of ‘soft’ information was called for with some
interviewees suggesting that boards should supplement
scorecards and metric based approaches with a narrative
or ‘reality check’ that connected with patient and staff
stories about particular experiences in the board room
[25-27].
if patients are saying there’s a worry, if staff are saying
things aren’t great and if the performance is beginning
to go down on some of the things that trusts had done
well in the past, those three things feel like a place to
start having other conversations. Then I suppose it’s
what you put in those baskets of indicators in those
three places
I completely buy into dashboards… But what is that
actually saying? And what’s the narrative to go with
that that persuades the public that you’ve recognised
something, and you’re doing something about it, and
you are minimising risk and harm as a consequence? I
think the dashboards are one thing but the second
thing is what the patient experience in this is? What is
the patient understanding of this? And what’s the
patient’s story to go with it?
These findings were also linked to ideas suggesting
that enhancing the intelligence available to the Board
about hospital performance could be gained by individ-
ual members proactively seeking to ‘triangulate’ hardperformance data with different information sources. A
more proactive stance in relation to soft intelligence was
needed with Board members being more open to infor-
mal feedback and conversations with patients and staff
regarding the quality of care:
Whether you have staff who will come in as observers
to the board and you’ll say to them, is that how it feels
like on your ward, as well as you’re getting out and
about and talking to people and bringing that
intelligence back to the board. I think that is crucial
because … you could get into a little bubble where it
all looked lovely because you’ve got mostly greens and
good answers for the ambers and the reds. So I do
think that reality check is crucial
storytelling needs to become much more a part of the
conversation quite literally and how we communicate
these issues
A number of additional benefits could also be gained
from the accumulation of soft intelligence. They included
providing Board members with improved confidence
when faced with any uncertainties and ambiguities identi-
fied in performance data. Soft intelligence could also facili-
tate improved dialogue between Board members as the
exposure to such information could facilitate the sharing
of experiences and insights about patient safety issues and
concerns.
Discussion
The narratives presented above highlight how effective
hospital board oversight of quality and safety can be re-
lated to a variety of governance activities. They draw our
attention to the limits of risk based governance and pro-
vide further evidence to arguments raised elsewhere
about the dysfunctions associated with overly excessive
forms of risk management [13]. In particular, the at-
tempts to reduce risk and manage uncertainty through a
focus on performance targets and measures often fail to
account for the wider experiential outcomes of organisa-
tional life [15]. While there is some support for dedi-
cated time and resources spent on quality and safety
issues within subcommittee governance structures, care
is needed to ensure that the promotion of governance
structures do not reinforce or legitimate a silo view of
patient safety governance where the oversight of safety
issues lies solely within the directorate of either the
nurse director or the medical director, deflecting the
corporate responsibility from the board as a whole.
Alongside these apparent challenges, the narratives
also direct us to different ways board oversight functions
and duties could be improved. The suggestions made
calling for Boards to further develop organisational
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that embodies patient safety appear suggest that a
change in current approaches to Board oversight is re-
quired. The notion of trust emerges here in the recom-
mendations that Boards do more to develop commonly
shared norms and values that go beyond regulatory
forms into the realm of normative and communicative
frameworks that encourage desired patterns of behav-
iour [22]. These findings also go to the very heart of
what Jennings et al. [34] see as hospital governance that
is more than a “commodity” but also involves the cre-
ation of a vibrant and viable hospital system with diverse
needs, skills and contributions.
For many hospital organisations, the combination of
these types of behaviours and practices may already be
in existence. However, there is still work to be done in
addressing the issues we raise. Within the English NHS
and beyond, hospital organisations are being required
more than ever to respond to quality and safety con-
cerns and demonstrate that they deliver compassionate
care through the promotion of relationships built on
empathy, respect and dignity [26,43,44]. The building
and strengthening of board skills to lead such changes
represent an important case in point leadership develop-
ment programmes are being put forward as a means to
develop the necessary skills in relation to involving,
communicating and engaging staff, patients and users
and other stakeholders [43]. Strengthening board re-
cruitment is also being proposed with an explicit focus
on values, attitudes and behaviours of potential candi-
dates in relation to care, compassion and respect [26].
This is particularly interesting in light of recent findings
suggesting that having more Board members with clin-
ical backgrounds is often associated with improved or-
ganisational performance [45].
The narratives provide a number of insights into the
trust dynamics that are associated with effective board
oversight of quality and safety. For example, they pro-
vide insights into how staff, patients and the public can
act as truster and board as trustee with calls for a
greater presence of staff, patients and the public within
Board meetings in order to shape strategy and hold the
executive to account. They also highlight elements of
the alternative dynamic with boards acting as truster
and organisational staff as trustee through the engage-
ment and dialogue with performance information. This
latter form of trust draws attention to how boards as
truster need to gather and ‘triangulate’ intelligence
through hard performance data such as HCAI rates but
also soft forms of information obtained through feed-
back and interactions with staff, patients and the public.
This form of trust requires Board members to go be-
yond standard performance metrics and proactively en-
gage in the qualitative dimensions of hospital lifeembodied in the stories, experiences and emotions re-
lated to patient care.
While these findings highlight a number of ways to
achieve different trust relationships, there are some im-
portant elements of the trust relationship that warrant
further analysis. Our findings support the points made
by Brown and Calnan who describe how trust is
achieved by placing moral and emotional obligations on
the trustee in the light of the truster’s positive expecta-
tions. Yet our findings remain largely underdeveloped in
thinking through how trust is achieved when it is under-
stood that sanctions will follow where this trust is disap-
pointed i.e. the role of sanctions to control behaviour.
Building on others [24], Brown and Calnan [14] develop
this line of inquiry as a form of ‘conditional trust’ for
governing healthcare professional behaviour achieved
principally by making clinical work more visible and ac-
countable, but doing so in a ‘soft’ rather than an overt or
coercive way. Their suggestions for achieving this form of
trust include the creation of outcomes evidence not ac-
companied by external monitoring; the encouragement of
clinical leadership to oversee and coordinate governance
systems; and clinically owned criteria to assess perform-
ance and refine standards.
While it has been beyond the scope of these narratives,
further study of what such effective sanctions would
look like for hospitals and how boards can enact these
sanctions within trust relationships is needed. One such
line of inquiry in relation to Board oversight of patient
safety would be to focus on the Board relationships and
interactions with whistleblowing. Whistleblowing – the
disclosure, either to a person in authority or in public, of
information concerning unsafe, unethical or illegal prac-
tices – would provide a fruitful line of inquiry in this re-
gard. How Boards interact with and encourage staff to
raise concerns is particularly relevant, in the context of
the current focus on improving whistleblowing policies
in the NHS [46]. Additional lines of inquiry can also be
identified in the study of how Boards interact with in-
creasingly personalised performance measures across
clinical specialities. This is particularly relevant within
the context of recent developments in the English NHS
to publish data on patient outcomes for 5,000 NHS
surgeons [47].
Conclusion
Effective hospital board oversight of quality and safety
requires greater engagement with issues related to trust
and intelligence. We suggest that further research is re-
quired to develop our emerging analysis. In particular,
research that looks at how the theoretical perspectives
of trust and intelligence translate throughout healthcare
organisations and across different healthcare govern-
ance arrangements would undoubtedly develop these
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our research goes some way to developing and refining
the application of theoretical perspectives of trust and
intelligence in the context of hospital board governance.
However, further work is needed to tease out these per-
spectives in particular healthcare contexts, and in par-
ticular how these are framed by different groups and
audiences. Questions concerning what make trust and
intelligence possible, for whom and in what circum-
stances is needed. Furthermore, the contextual condi-
tions required for trust and intelligence to occur and be
sustained is something that future research will be re-
quired to address.
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